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Judicial Activism and
Fourteenth Amendment
Privacy Claims:
The Allure of Originalism and
the Unappreciated Promise of
Constrained Nonoriginalism*
Daniel 0. Conkle**

I. Introduction
Nearly half a century ago, Professor
Alexander Bickel spawned a vigorous and
ongoing academic debate by identifying
the "root difficulty" of judicial reviewthat it is "a countermajoritarian force in
our society."1 As Bickel explained, the Supreme Court may claim to speak for "the
people," but when it "declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an
elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the

here and now," supporting the charge
that "judicial review is undemocratic."2
Some two decades later, in the 1980s, Attorney General Edwin Meese III made
the academic debate a matter of public
concern even as he announced a position
that would heavily influence the appointment of Justices by President Reagan
and subsequent Republican presidents.
According to Meese, judicial review is legitimate only when confined to a "juris-
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prudence of original intention," 3 the
forerunner of contemporary originalism.
Citing democratic precepts and the rule
of law, Meese argued that the Supreme
Court and other courts should confine
themselves to "the original meaning of
constitutional provisions . . . as the only
reliable guide for judgment. "1 4 In this
fashion, courts could enforce constitutional principles without acting undemocratically because they would be
giving effect to values that were originally placed in the Constitution by a
democratic process, that of constitutional
enactment or constitutional amendment.
Conversely, Meese maintained, courts
have no business enforcing other values
5
in the name of the Constitution.
Constitutional theory and practice
have evolved since Bickel and Meese offered their notable contributions, but the
underlying issues remain unchanged.
How can judicial enforcement of the Constitution, including the judicial recognition of individual rights, be reconciled
with democratic self-government and
with the norm of judicial objectivity?
These issues present themselves in various settings, but they are cast in stark relief in Fourteenth Amendment "privacy"
cases. Did the Supreme Court exceed its
authority in Roe v. Wade?e Was it right to
protect sexual liberty in Lawrence v.

Texas?7 Should the Court extend its privacy precedents to protect a right to
same-sex marriage? In cases such as
these, the Supreme Court-an unelected
and politically insulated institution-is
asked to recognize novel claims of right
on the basis of constitutional language no
more specific than the generalities of the
Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. Can the Court legitimately recognize such claims, and, if so, according
to what decisionmaking methodology?
The charge of "judicial activism" (as
contrasted with "judicial restraint") is
used by critics of all sorts, in various settings and with various meanings. Focusing specifically on the Supreme Court's
consideration of Fourteenth Amendment
privacy claims, however, one can usefully
define judicial activism-or "legislating
from the bench"-by linking it directly to
the countermajoritarian difficulty identified by Bickel and to Meese's attempt to
cabin the judicial role. So understood, judicial activism is Supreme Court decisionmaking that (1) frustrates the
process of majoritarian self-government
and (2) is a product of judicial discretion,
unconstrained by controlling sources of
law. In reality, however, each of these
two dimensions is a matter of degree,
meaning that judicial decisionmaking
can be more or less activist (or, con-

3. Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S.
TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (text of speech to American Bar Association in Washington, D.C., July 9, 1985)
(emphasis omitted).
4. Id. at 465-66.
5. See id. at 464-66. For contemporary media accounts, see Philip Shenon, Meese and His New Vision of
the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1985, at 14; Stuart Taylor Jr., Administration Trolling for Constitutional
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1985, at 10.
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

Daniel 0. Conkle
versely, more or less restrained), depending on the character of the Court's
decisionmaking methodology.
One might contend that judicial activism, so understood, plays a valuable
role in contemporary American government. For present purposes, I do not deny
the strength of that argument. Even so,
surely we can agree that judicial activism
is at least presumptively problematic, because majoritarian self-government is a
vital democratic value and because constitutional interpretation-like judicial
decisionmaking generally-should not
merely entail open-ended judicial policymaking; it should be constrained by objective criteria. Perhaps judicial activism
can be defended nonetheless, but only if it
serves a function that is sufficiently important to justify its departure from the
usual norms of majoritarian self-government and objectively determined judicial
decisionmaking.
My purpose here, however, is not so
much to defend judicial activism as to
consider its presumptively problematic
character and to assess and reevaluate
the originalist solution that has customarily been proposed. Attorney General
Meese believed that adherence to
originalism would control the Supreme
Court's discretion even as it preserved
majoritarian self-government, and contemporary critics tend to agree. But as I
will explain, originalism may be overrated in its constraining force, and, conversely, some forms of nonoriginalist
8.

interpretation-in particular, those that
rely on objective determinations of traditional or contemporary American societal
values-may constrain the Court in
meaningful ways. Relatedly, originalism
may frustrate majoritarian self-government no less than these competing nonoriginalist methodologies, which, indeed,
can be seen as relatively inoffensive to
majoritarian values. As a result, critics of
judicial activism might wish to reconsider
their typical stance, that of embracing
originalism and rejecting nonoriginalism
as categorically illegitimate.
II. Majoritarian SelfGovernment and Judicial
Objectivity
Judicial activism is presumptively
problematic because it undermines two
fundamental values: majoritarian selfgovernment and judicial objectivity. The
principle of (representative) majoritarian
self-government traces its origins to the
Declaration of Independence. 8 Moreover,
as Professor John Hart Ely explained,
constitutional amendments have repeatedly expanded the franchise, "substantially strengthen[ing] the original
commitment to control by a majority of
the governed" and making it ever more
apparent that "rule in accord with the
consent of a majority of those governed is
the core of the American governmental
system."9 Judicial objectivity is likewise a
consensus value, a value closely linked to
the rule of law itself. Courts are not "na-

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted among Men,

deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.").
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980).
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ked power organs." 10 Rather, as Justice
Cardozo insisted, their task is that "of a
translator, the reading of signs and symbols given from without."" Judicial decisionmaking, including constitutional
interpretation, should be based upon objectively determined values, not merely
the judges' own.
III.

Is Originalism the Answer?

At first glance, originalism seems a
well-designed response to the problem of
judicial activism. It honors the value of
majoritarian self-government by grounding itself in the majoritarian process that
produced the Constitution, including its
amendments, and it honors the value of
judicial objectivity by carefully confining
the judicial role. In the words of Attorney
General Meese, the Supreme Court is to
do no more than uncover and enforce "the
original meaning of constitutional provisions."12 It has no license to update the
Constitution, to transform its meaning,
or to give effect to the Justices' own values or ideological dispositions.
But can originalism truly constrain
and guide the Justices in any definitive
way? Justice Brennan thought not. In a
contemporaneous response to Meese,
Brennan offered criticisms that continue
to resonate. Brennan contended that

"doctrinaire" originalism amounts to "arrogance cloaked as humility."' 3 Such an
approach, he argued, "feigns self-effacing
deference to the specific judgments of
those who forged our original social compact,"' 4 but this is pretense. As Brennan
explained, the historical evidence typically is sparse and ambiguous, and, because every constitutional provision had
multiple framers and ratifiers, there are
serious conceptual and practical problems in attempting to discern the collective intention that underlies it.
At the same time, if we cannot identify this collective intention with any degree of specificity, it is difficult to argue
that originalism, except in the most general and amorphous sense, is truly in
service of majoritarian values-that is,
values that were constitutionalized by
the framers and ratifiers through a majoritarian governmental process. Indeed,
if originalism can take us no further
than broad constitutional generalities,
we might be led to adopt Justice Brennan's view that the Constitution protects
"the human dignity of every individual,"15
as well as his generalized response to
the countermajoritarian difficulty itselfthat the Constitution, at some level of abstraction, in fact was intended to protect
minority rights as well as majority rule.16
If originalism cannot meaningfully con-

10. Courts "are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of
law." Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
11. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921).
12. Meese, supra note 3, at 465-66.
13. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: ContemporaryRatification, 27 S. TEx.
L. REV. 433, 435 (1986) (text of speech at Georgetown University, October 12, 1985).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 439.
16. See id. at 436-37.
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strain, it honors neither the value of judicial objectivity nor, in any concrete sense,
the value of majoritarian self-government.
Despite Brennan's objections, originalism has gained ground since the
1980s. It plays a powerful role in contemporary Supreme Court decisionmaking,
and it has been endorsed to one degree or
another by a wide range of academic commentators, leading one to proclaim, "We
are all originalists now."17 Not quite, but
the movement is clearly in that direction.
Yet today's originalism is not the "doctrinaire" originalism of the 1980s. Rather,
originalism has evolved and matured, in
part to meet the objections identified by
Brennan and others. As Vasan Kesavan
and Michael Stokes Paulsen have explained, the focus of originalism has
gradually shifted from the "original intent" of the framers to the "original understanding" of the ratifiers and on to the
"original meaning" of the constitutional
text. 8 The "original meaning" approach,
which currently dominates, "asks not
what the Framers or Ratifiers meant or
understood subjectively, but what their
words would have meant objectivelyhow they would have been understood by
an ordinary, reasonably well-informed
user of the language, in context, at the

17.

time, within the relevant political community that adopted them." 19
The original meaning approach addresses some of the analytical difficulties
associated with originalism, but it arguably weakens originalism's majoritarian
foundations by shifting the focus away
from the intentions and understandings
of the officials who voted to adopt the constitutional provision in question.2 0 In any
event, the original meaning approach
does not alleviate, and it may exacerbate,
the potential for open-ended and unconstrained "originalist" decisionmaking.
Professor Richard S. Kay argues that this
new version of originalism generally
should lead to the same results as the
older (and in his view wiser) variants, but
Kay notes that the original meaning approach potentially can generate "an enlarged range of plausible outcomes,
threatening to subvert the clarity and
stability of constitutional meaning that is
central to the constitutionalist enterprise." 21 In reality, it is doubtful that
originalism of any variety can produce
clear and stable interpretive outcomes,
especially if interpreters feel free to read
the original meaning-or intention or understanding-at a high level of generality
or abstraction, one that permits Justices
and commentators of all stripes to join
the chorus, "We are all originalists now."

Jeffrey Rosen, OriginalistSin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia and its Intellectual Incoherence,

THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26.

18. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003).
19. Id. at 1144-45 (footnote omitted); see id. at 1127-33, 1139-48.
20. See Richard S. Kay, OriginalIntention and Public Meaningin ConstitutionalInterpretation, 103 Nw.
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 16-22, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1259867).
21. Id. at 2 (manuscript); see id. at 22-31.
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The Supreme Court's recent decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller22 is revealing. All nine Justices embraced
originalist reasoning to resolve the question before them: whether the Second
Amendment protects an individual right
to possess and use weapons for nonmilitary purposes. 23 Five Justices said yes;
four said no. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia invoked the original meaning approach, dissecting the Second
Amendment's language and exhaustively
canvassing historical materials from
before, during, and after the founding period, all to determine the meaning of the
text at the time of its adoption. 24 Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Stevens
employed a similar approach, parsing the
Amendment's text and analyzing the
same sorts of historical data as Scalia,
but reaching the polar opposite conclusion. 25 At least in Heller, originalism
"struck out" as an objective methodology. 26 Plausibly supporting each side of
the debate, it provided no objective guidelines that were sufficiently clear to control the Justices' discretion. For the same
reason, Heller cannot be said to honor
any discernable majoritarian decision
that was made through the political pro-

cess by which the Second Amendment
was adopted.
What, then, of Fourteenth Amendment privacy claims? Even if originalism
could not control the Supreme Court's
discretion in Heller, surely, one might assume, it can rule out the recognition of
unenumerated rights grounded in nothing more than the general language of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court's
most persistent proponents of originalism, have suggested that they would be
inclined to repudiate the Court's privacy
precedents, at least to the extent that
these precedents rely on the doctrine of
substantive due process, 27 and their view
is strongly supported by the text of the
Due Process Clause. 2 Even so, the meaning of "due process of law" at the time of
the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption is
not entirely free from doubt. Thus, according to Professor Laurence H. Tribe,
"there is a reasonable historical argument that, by 1868, a recognized meaning
of the qualifying phrase 'of law' was sub'
In any event, there is other
stantive."29
language in the Fourteenth Amendment.
It protects "the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States" and "the

22. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
23. The Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. II.
24. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-2812.
25. Stevens relied in part on the Second Amendment's legislative and drafting history, suggesting a focus
on original intent as opposed to meaning, but much of his opinion was devoted to refuting the majority's original meaning analysis on its own terms. See id. at 2822-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Of Judicial Methods and Judicial Integrity: Has Originalism Struck Out?,
PREVIEW U.S. SuP. CT. CAS., Aug. 11, 2008, at 386.
27. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
28. See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493 (1997).
29. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1333 (3d ed. 2000).
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equal protection of the laws." 3o To date,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause has
been read narrowly by the Supreme
Court31 but the original meaning of this
provision arguably is much broader than
the Court has so far recognized. And the
Court has already extended the Equal
Protection Clause well beyond its specific
historical objectives,32 an interpretation
plausibly within the original meaning of
the Clause, broadly understood.
Relying especially on the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, Professor Jack M. Balkin,
a progressive convert to originalism, recently has demonstrated the far-reaching
potential of originalist interpretation. Focusing on the constitutional text and its
underlying principles (as opposed to its
expected applications), Balkin contends
that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is sufficiently capacious to support not only unenumerated
rights, but the most controversial
unenumerated right of all: the right to
abortion. 3 At first blush, Balkin's argument seems strained, but in reality it is
not unreasonable. The critical question is
the level of abstraction at which the original meaning properly is characterized.
Balkin characterizes the original meaning generally, permitting him to support
30. U.S.

the basic result (if not the details or reasoning) of Roe v. Wade34-a decision
widely regarded as the Supreme Court's
most activist individual rights decision in
the last half century, if not in the Court's
entire history. Needless to say, Justices
Scalia and Thomas, among others, would
reject Balkin's argument by characterizing the original meaning much more narrowly. Yet the very existence of
competing views on this question, views
that cannot be dismissed as untenable,
highlights the weakness of originalism in
providing objective standards that can
control the discretion of the Court-even
(and perhaps especially) in resolving
claims arising under the general lan5
guage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
And if the Justices can reasonably decide
these questions either way, their decisions cannot be said to rest on the policymaking of the majoritarian representatives who framed and ratified the
Amendment.
IV. Unconstrained
Nonoriginalism
Many assume that nonoriginalism is
unconstrained by objective criteria and
necessarily entails the judicial flouting of
majoritarian self-government. The Su-

CONST. amend. XIV.
31. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74-80 (1873); cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (reading
the Clause to protect certain equality rights, but only in the context of durational residence requirements).
32. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
33. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291 (2007).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Cf Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMM. 427, 488
(2007). ("[I]f what matters to us is the original meaning of the text, then the principles underlying the constitutional text should be as general as the text itself.")
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preme Court itself has contributed to this
impression, sometimes suggesting that
the Justices' own philosophical and policy
analysis is enough to justify the recognition of unenumerated rights. Roe v.
Wade, for instance, rested heavily on the
Justices' appraisal of competing interests
in the context of abortion.36 And when the
Court later reaffirmed Roe's "central
holding" in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 37 it relied
not only on precedent but also on "reasoned judgment," 3 offering what it called
39
an "explication of individual liberty."
"At the heart of liberty," the Court declared, "is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human
life."40 Accordingly, "[t]he destiny of the
woman must be shaped to a large extent
on her own conception of her spiritual im41
peratives and her place in society."
Echoing Roe, the Court carefully examined and evaluated the specific concerns of a woman seeking an abortion,
and it concluded that her interest warrants special constitutional protection.
Recalibrating the state's competing inter-

est in protecting fetal life, the Casey
Court adopted the "undue burden" test to
replace Roe's "strict scrutiny, " 42 but it
continued to protect the right to choose
abortion prior to fetal viability, citing not
only stare decisis but also the Justices'
own understandings of "reason" and "fair'4 3

ness."

Whatever the merits of this sort of
44
creative, unconstrained nonoriginalism,
it is frankly at odds with the values of
majoritarian self-government and judicial objectivity, and it therefore constitutes an aggressive form of judicial
activism. To be sure, originalism, in the
right (or wrong) hands, can be equally
unconstrained and therefore equally activist. Witness the Supreme Court's split
decision in Heller and Professor Balkin's
originalist defense of the right to abortion. If judicial activism is the problem
(or at least a presumptive problem), it
may be that the solution lies neither in
originalism nor in unconstrained nonoriginalism-interpretive
approaches
that, in the end, may have more in com45
mon than first meets the eye.

36. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-66.
37. 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
38. Id. at 849.
39. Id. at 853.
40. Id. at 851.
41. Id. at 852.
42. See id. at 869-79 (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 870.
44. Elsewhere I have argued that an approach along these lines has important strengths but is plagued
by serious weaknesses. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63,
98-115 (2006).
45. Cf. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 32 (arguing that Heller reflected "a freewheeling discretion strongly flavored
with ideology"); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the UnravelingRule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV.
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V.

Constrained Nonoriginalism

Nonoriginalism, by definition, is not
constrained by the original meaning-or
intention or understanding-of the constitutional text. Yet this concession does
not necessarily leave the Justices "free to
roam where unguided speculation might
take them."4 6 In the context of Fourteenth Amendment privacy claims, Roe
and Casey reveal the open-ended potential of unconstrained nonoriginalism, but
other cases suggest that nonoriginalism
can be more modest. Indeed, the Court's
decisions in this setting support two competing theories of constrained nonoriginalism: the theory of historical
tradition and the theory of evolving national values.
According to the first theory, the
Court is authorized to recognize
unenumerated rights only if the rights
can be found in an objective appraisal of
American social and legal history. According to the second, more progressive
theory, the Court can identify unenumerated rights on the basis of an objective determination of contemporary national
values, including values emerging over
time. As I will explain, these two approaches are relatively non-activist, because they honor majoritarian selfgovernment and judicial objectivity to a
considerable degree-certainly more so

than unconstrained nonoriginalism or its
jurisprudential first cousin, unconstrained originalism.
A. The Theory of Historical
Tradition
According to the theory of historical
tradition, unenumerated privacy rights
need not be traced to the original meaning (or intention or understanding) of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Yet the theory
nonetheless demands a historical inquiry, and it authorizes only a narrowly
confined nonoriginalism. Embracing this
theory in Washington v. Glucksberg,47 the
Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
unenumerated rights extends only to
those liberties, narrowly and specifically
defined, that are "'deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."' 41 "Our
Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices," the Court explained, "provide
the crucial 'guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking' that direct and restrain
our exposition of the Due Process
Clause,"49 providing a "restrained methodology" that minimizes the risk of subjective judicial decisionmaking.56 Applying this approach in the case at hand, the
Court refused to recognize a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
Based upon its analysis of state laws and
their common law antecedents, the Court

(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265118) (comparing Heller with Roe
and arguing that both involved the activist invalidation of majoritarian policies).
46. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
48. Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
49. Id. at 721 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
50. See id. at 721-22.

NEXUS
concluded that, with rare exception, "our
laws have consistently condemned, and
continue to prohibit, assisting suicide,"51
producing "a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the
asserted right, and continues explicitly to
reject it today, even for terminally ill,
5 2
mentally competent adults."
Although the Court rejected the constitutional claim in Glucksberg, the theory of historical tradition supports the
Court's recognition of unenumerated
rights in other cases. In Glucksberg, for
example, the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Departmentof Health53 as one that
protected "the traditional right to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment," 5 4 a right derived from "the common-law rule that forced medication was
a battery" and "the long legal tradition
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment." 55 This theory
also supports the Court's decision in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.56 In
Moore, the Court invalidated a housing
ordinance that restricted occupancy to
"nuclear families," thereby protecting the
right of extended families to live together. As Justice Powell explained in his

plurality opinion, "the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition," and this historical
tradition extends to "uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing
a household along with parents and children."5 7 Similar reasoning may also explain the Court's holdings (if not always
its opinions) in other cases protecting
marital and family rights that have longstanding support in the American legal
system. 58
The theory of historical tradition authorizes a form of constitutional interpretation that is nonoriginalist but highly
conservative. By preserving "deeply
rooted" rights, the Supreme Court furthers stability in the law, protects societal expectations concerning individual
freedom, and protects "the accumulated
wisdom of civilization,"'59 advancing a
Burkean constitutional vision by precluding precipitous departures from timehonored traditions.6 ° At least as articulated in Glucksberg, moreover, the
Court's methodology is objective, constrained, and confined. The Court is to
define the constitutional claim narrowly
and with precision, and it is then to canvass American social and legal history

51. Id. at 719.
52. Id. at 723.
53. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
54. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
55. Id. at 725.
56. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
57. Id. at 503-04 (plurality opinion).
58. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
59. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion).
60. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudenceof Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV.
665, 682-85 & n.96 (1997).
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(and its antecedents), working from the
past to the present, to determine whether
the claim has broad and longstanding
historical as well as contemporary support. To be sure, there is no litmus test,
and the Court cannot entirely avoid a
normative judgment, because it must decide whether the claim of liberty is not
only traditional but also valuable and
worthy of constitutional recognition. But
the Court cannot go beyond the recognition of deeply rooted rights, determined
by objective inquiry. And the constitutionalization of these deeply rooted rights
is in relative harmony with the principle
of majoritarian self-government, because
the Court protects only rights that, over
time, have been recognized, approved,
and maintained by the American people
and their elected representatives.61
B. The Theory of Evolving
National Values
There is a competing and more progressive theory of constrained nonoriginalism, the theory of evolving
national values. As with the theory of historical tradition, this approach requires
the Supreme Court to canvass American
social and legal history as it relates to the
particular claim at hand. But it does not
limit constitutional protection to liberties
that are deeply rooted in American history. Instead, the critical question under
this approach is whether, on the basis of

objective criteria, the asserted individual
right has broad contemporary support in
the national culture. This contemporary
support might be a continuation of longstanding tradition. To this extent, the
theory of evolving national values encompasses the theory of historical tradition.
But the contemporary support might reflect a change from the past. What matters is the current, evolved state of our
national culture, including especially our
national legal culture.
The theory of evolving national values has not been expressly embraced by
the Supreme Court. Even so, it finds implicit support in the Court's jurisprudence, including especially the Court's
most recent privacy decision, Lawrence v.
Texas .62 In Lawrence, the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
right of consenting adults to engage in
private sexual conduct, including homosexual conduct. This result could not be
justified under the theory of historical
tradition,63 and the Court's opinion, although ambiguous and multifaceted, can
be read to suggest the theory of evolving
national values. The Court considered
the centuries-long legal and social condemnation of sodomy, but it cited an
"emerging awareness" concerning the
proper scope of personal liberty and argued that "our laws and traditions in the
past half century are of most relevance

61. For a much more elaborate discussion and evaluation of the theory of historical tradition, see Conkle,
supra note 44, at 83-98.
62. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
63. Plainly, this is not a deeply rooted, traditional liberty. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Conkle, supra note 44, at 117-18.
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here."64 The Court noted that a substantial majority of the states, rejecting past
history, had decriminalized consensual
sodomy, and that it was rarely prosecuted even in the thirteen states that had
not.65. In short, the constitutional claim
was supported by a general consensus in
the national legal culture, objectively discernable in the contemporary pattern of
state laws and enforcement efforts. In declaring an unenumerated constitutional
right, the Court did no more than bring
outlier states into conformity with the
general national pattern.
Unlike the conservative, backwardlooking philosophy that undergirds the
theory of historical tradition, the theory
of evolving national values is grounded in
a more forward-looking, progressive understanding of American political morality. Under this theory, the Court can do
more than preserve traditional rights. It
also can recognize new rights, rights
emerging over time. This approach thus
protects liberty to a greater degree even
as it promotes a philosophy of politicalmoral progress. But the Court's decisionmaking is not open-ended. Rather, it is
constrained by the requirement of a contemporary national consensus, which
must exist for the particular claim at
hand.

As with the "deeply rooted" inquiry
under the theory of historical tradition,
the requirement of a contemporary national consensus does not provide a
bright-line test. There must be a general
consensus among the states, not uniformity or even near-uniformity, creating the
potential for close questions and differences of opinion. And even if the required
consensus exists, the Court must decide,
by normative evaluation, whether the
claim of liberty is worthy of constitutional
protection. That is, it must decide
whether the consensus should be constitutionalized as an unenumerated right,
bringing outlier states in line and making
the general consensus a matter of national uniformity. Despite its ambiguities, however, this approach, like that of
historical tradition and for similar reasons, honors the values of judicial objectivity and majoritarian self-government
to a substantial degree. The Court cannot
go beyond the recognition of rights
supported by an objectively determined
contemporary national consensus, a consensus grounded in social patterns and
legal policies reflecting broadly shared
values and majoritarian policymaking.66
The potential-and the limits-of
this theory of unenumerated rights can
be seen in the context of same-sex marriage. Although rights relating to hetero-

64. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72; cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that substantive due process should be informed by "the traditions from which [this country] developed" and "the traditions from which it broke," because 'tradition is a living thing").
65. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73. The Court also cited comparable developments abroad. See id.
66. Elsewhere I have elaborated and defended the theory of evolving national values, drawing upon the
Supreme Court's suggestive language in Lawrence v. Texas and contending that the appropriate methodology
for identifying unenumerated rights is similar to the Court's "evolving standards of decency" analysis in
Eighth Amendment capital cases. See Conlde, supra note 44, at 123-48.
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sexual marriage are deeply rooted, samesex marriage has no such pedigree and
therefore could not be protected under
the theory of historical tradition. Under
the theory of evolving national values,
however, the absence of historical support is not determinative, and a constitutional right could emerge over time. At
present, the Supreme Court could not
properly declare a right to same-sex marriage, because there is nothing close to a
national consensus favoring such a right,
nor even a right to comparable legal benefits. Only a handful of states currently
authorize same-sex marriages, and several acted only under the compulsion of
state court rulings invoking state constitutional law.67 Fewer than ten additional
states provide legal benefits for same-sex
couples through civil union or domestic
partnership laws.eY In time, however, the
national tide may very well turn in favor
of same-sex marriage, or at least in favor
of comparable legal benefits, creating a
general consensus that would support the
recognition of an unenumerated Fourteenth Amendment right. Only then
could the Court legitimately rule in that
manner. Under this theory, the Court can
promote political-moral progress, but
only to a degree, and only in a manner befitting the limited role of the judiciary in
a democratic society.

VI.

Conclusion

It is commonly believed that originalism is the answer to the problem of judicial activism, but recent judicial and
academic elaborations of originalism
raise serious doubts. Conversely, nonoriginalism, in particular forms, can
rein in judicial activism by confining the
Supreme Court to a decisionmaking
methodology that is guided by objective
criteria and that can operate in relative
harmony with the value of majoritarian
self-government. Under any interpretive
theory, the recognition of unenumerated
rights is activist to a degree, but functional arguments may justify an activism
that is relatively confined and not excessively undemocratic. I have discussed two
theories of constrained nonoriginalism
that warrant serious consideration on
this basis. The theory of historical tradition posits a conservative, Burkean function. That of evolving national values
invokes a more forward-looking, progressive function, grounded in the belief that
American political morality can and does
evolve and improve over time.
Given the elastic margins of contemporary originalism, it would not be difficult to characterize either or both of these
theories as originalist rather than nonoriginalist. Professor (now Judge)
Michael W. McConnell, for example, has
linked the approach of historical tradition

67. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, No. 07-1499, 2009 WL 874044 (Iowa Apr.
3, 2009). Such state-court decisions do not directly reflect majoritarian decisionmaking and therefore are of
limited weight in discerning a consensus of majoritarian values. See Conkle, supra note 44, at 135 & n.401.
68. The Human Rights Campaign helpfully documents, catalogs, and maps the laws of all fifty states on
its web site. See http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship-RecognitionLaws-Map.pdf.
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to the original meaning of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, read alongside the
Due Process Clause.6 9 And an abstract
conception of the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning, A la Professor
Balkin, likewise could be used to support
70
the theory of evolving national values. If
so, then these approaches might qualify
as constrained originalism, rather than
constrained nonoriginalism.
Contrary to McConnell and Balkin, I
would frankly concede that the theories
of historical tradition and evolving national values are nonoriginalist. The con-

straints of each theory are real, but they
do not derive from the original intent, the
original understanding, or the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
More to the point, the critical distinction
is not between originalism and nonoriginalism. That distinction is increasingly evanescent. What matters is the
methodology by which the Supreme
Court identifies unenumerated rights
and whether that methodology honors
the values of majoritarian self-government and judicial objectivity.

69. See McConnell, supra note 60, at 691-98.
70. Indeed, aspects of Balkin's argument can be read to suggest an approach somewhat along these lines.
See Balkin, supra note 33, at 329-36.

